Isolationism, Trump and Nixon, and the Future of Camptown Prostitution in South Korea
Songtan is a South Korean city adjacent to Osan Air Base, a military installation which has been in the service of the U.S. military since the days of the Korean War. Songtan may look like any other city on the outskirts of Seoul, with high-rises and urban centers giving way to farmlands and nature reserves. Yet if one ventures “downtown” at nighttime, to the part of the city closest to the air base, red lights indicate a different kind of city. Here, U.S. soldiers in fatigues walk the streets, peering into nightclubs with signs reading “Hook Up Club” or “Whisky a-Go-Go.” Inside, there may be groups of women wearing tight skirts and low-cut dresses, sitting at bars, waiting for soldiers to buy them a drink. A drink at this establishment might cost $100, but it’s really not the drink these soldiers are paying for.
This is a military camptown, a community of hotels, bars, sex workers, and soldiers which has arisen alongside U.S. military bases in South Korea. Here, U.S. servicemen solicit sex from Korean and foreign-born prostitutes in a system of military prostitution which has persisted for more than seventy years. Though diminished by the forces of liberal reform and anti-prostitution laws, the “world’s oldest profession” remains rampant in those communities who service the men and women of the United States Forces Korea (USFK).
The History of Camptown Prostitution: The Korean War, Government Toleration, and Ensuing Controversy
The history of camptowns stretches to the end of the Second World War, with the dissolution of the Japanese Empire and the establishment of an American military government on the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. Though the U.S. withdrew from the country in 1948 upon the creation of the South Korean civilian government, millions of U.S. soldiers were redeployed with the outbreak of the Korean War, during which camptowns developed to service soldiers on the frontline. As historian Taejin Hwang writes, “[t]he Korean War and the forces of abject poverty [...] forced a number of [Korean] women into prostitution to ensure the survival of themselves and their families.” It is within this context of poverty and devastating loss that camptowns developed and remained after the Korean War, when the U.S. established a permanent military presence in South Korea following the two countries’ signing of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty.
Camptown prostitution continued throughout much of the Cold War with the acquiescence of both the U.S. and South Korean governments. U.S. commanders believed that prostitution was necessary to keep their soldiers “happy,” and justified camptown prostitution as advancing “friendly relations” between U.S. soldiers and the South Korean people. Yet this was also a system that the South Korean government promoted under the autocratic leadership of President Park Chung Hee, who believed that the sex trade was integral to South Korea’s postwar economic development. Throughout the 1960s, the Park government established “special districts” in camptown areas—which enjoyed tax benefits and lax law enforcement procedures—in the name of promoting “tourism.” Though prostitution was technically illegal, the injection of crucial U.S. dollars into the Korean economy through the sex trade was deemed to be of greater importance by the Park government.
The camptown prostitution system has been duly criticized as exploitative of South Korea’s historic situation, where the country simply lacked the liberty to defy the will of the U.S. military. Given the enduring Communist threat, much of the South Korean public believed that camptown prostitution was a “necessary evil” which ensured the U.S. would continue its defense commitment. In terms of economics, one U.S. army officer estimated that 25% of the South Korean GNP during the 1960s was a product of U.S. servicemen’s expenditures, such as food, entertainment, and of course, prostitution.* Likewise, an official of the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was purported to have said that by asking the Korean government to crack down on prostitution, the U.S. military was “asking us to cut a source of revenue which [...] provides [a] livelihood for uncounted thousands.” These sources are not definitive, yet they illustrate how officials in both governments acutely understood how these communities, and the nation at large, were reliant on prostitution for their economic survival. Indeed, Korea scholars have described the stationing of U.S. troops in Korea as a form of “foreign domination,” in which the U.S. has taken advantage of South Korea’s developing status to force thousands of young women into sexual servitude.
*This figure first appeared in Katharine Moon’s Sex Among Allies, and has been cited prominently in Korea scholarship (e.g., Na Young Lee’s “The Construction of Military Prostitution in South Korea During the U.S. Military Rule, 1945-1948,” or Taejin Hwang’s “An Indispensable Edge: American Military Camptowns in Postwar Korea” in Mobile Subjects: Boundaries and Identities in the Modern Korean Diaspora). Nonetheless, it is the estimate of just one U.S. officer, and should be taken with a grain of salt.
Current Developments: Trumpism, and the Threat to Withdraw
The U.S. military presence in South Korea endures to this day, with 24,234 active-duty servicemen stationed on nine major bases throughout the country. Yet Americans have increasingly questioned the value of their commitments abroad, culminating in the reelection of Donald Trump as President of the United States. During his first term, President Trump repeatedly attempted to weaken U.S. economic and military ties with South Korea. He threatened to pull out from KORUS, the 2007 free trade agreement between the U.S. and South Korea that forms the bedrock of the two countries’ economic relations. He likewise attempted to halt the installation of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense systems in South Korea, which have the capacity to shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles. Perhaps most shockingly, President Trump had apparently sought a “complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.” During a July 20th, 2017 military briefing, for instance, an administration official asked President Trump what he would need stationed in South Korea to “sleep at night.” “I wouldn’t need a f—ing thing,” the president reportedly said, “And I’d sleep like a baby.”
When President Trump returns to power on January 20th, 2025, he threatens to pursue the same isolationist policy. The Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, more commonly known as “Project 2025,” calls for South Korea to “take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea.” If implemented in some form, this policy would likely entail a reduction in U.S. troop sizes in Korea. Though Trump has repeatedly disavowed “Project 2025” on the campaign trail, his cabinet picks include several of the authors of the playbook, among other isolationist types who would like to see the U.S. scale back its commitments abroad.
What a Withdrawal May Incur: Lessons From the “Nixon Doctrine”
However, history demonstrates that reductions in the U.S. military presence in Korea directly impact the ability of camptown workers to sustain their own livelihood. In her seminal work on the camptown system, Sex Among Allies, historian Katharine Moon describes how “the lives of Korean women working as prostitutes [...] have been inseparably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations.” Consequently, when the U.S. has determined to reduce its troop levels in Korea, those sex workers working within military camptowns have suffered as a result.
This occurred in the early 1970s as a result of the “Nixon Doctrine,” which sought to scale back U.S. foreign commitments to ensure the U.S. remained economically competitive. The policy was announced during a stopover visit in Guam, when President Nixon declared on July 25th, 1969, that “as far as the problems of military defense” were concerned, the U.S. would expect the issue to be increasingly handled “by the Asian nations themselves.” The “Nixon Doctrine” would ultimately result in the withdrawal of some 20,000 U.S. troops from South Korea by 1971. Some military bases in Korea had their personnel reduced; others were abandoned entirely, and the camptown communities which had risen up alongside U.S. military installations were crippled as a result.
Thousands of camptown workers during this time—including prostitutes, nightclub owners, and shopkeepers—were displaced and without their jobs. A joint committee composed of both U.S.and South Korean officials concluded that the withdrawal had “resulted in widespread dislocations among Koreans living [...] adjacent to U.S. bases.” The Korea Herald reported that as many as 6,000 Koreans, out of an estimated 32,000 employed in camptowns, had lost their jobs. One camptown, which in the summer of 1970 had “boasted a total of over 2,200 ‘entertainers,’” had by July 1971 a mere 200 women remaining. If President-elect Trump is to enact a similar withdrawal of U.S. forces, the effect on camptown life and livelihood would be potentially devastating.
The Contemporary Camptown System
Military prostitution in South Korea, and camptowns generally, have significantly diminished in the past fifty years. This is due in part to gradual U.S. troop withdrawals reducing the clientele of camptown workers. Yet more significantly, the country at large has grown far less dependent upon prostitution for its economic survival as South Korea has grown into the economic powerhouse it is today. Korean women have found increasing opportunities in other labor sectors and thus have not been coerced into prostitution. To compensate for the decline in the domestic labor pool, however, prostitutes have increasingly arrived from developing countries—namely, ex-Soviet and Southeast Asian countries—whose economies prosper from the flow of U.S. dollars. As of 2005, foreigners comprised some 90% of the prostitutes working in military camptowns.
The political landscape surrounding camptown prostitution has also dramatically transformed from the policy of promotion and tolerance throughout much of the Cold War, to that of overt hostility today. With the fall of the military dictatorship, opposition to the U.S. military presence could finally take hold in policy. Incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by U.S. soldiers, such as the 1992 murder of Korean sex worker Yun Geum-i and the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, sparked protests among feminists, religious groups, and other Korean activists. Following these protests, in 2004, the South Korean government passed the Special Law on Sex Trade, criminalizing prostitution and its solicitation. Importantly, the law was followed by a substantial crackdown on prostitution and has led to the closure of some high-profile brothels within camptown communities.
Furthermore, the U.S. military has increasingly acknowledged its own role in the propagation of sex trafficking. In 2004, President George W. Bush signed an executive order criminalizing the solicitation of prostitutes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Pursuant to this order, in 2014, the USFK authorized local commanders to prohibit their soldiers from visiting establishments perceived as fronts for prostitution–namely, those aforementioned bars where soldiers would pay for overly-expensive “drinks.”
This combination of economic development, legal reform, troop withdrawal, and public opposition has significantly diminished the camptown prostitution system. Nonetheless, prostitution endures in a significant capacity in South Korea, with journalists continuing to report on the camptown businesses which thinly veil prostitution schemes. Should the Trump Administration determine to withdraw U.S. troops from the country, historical precedent would lead us to believe that camptown communities would be hit hard as a result. The withdrawal of U.S. troops is not wholly inevitable, however. In remarks to the Economic Club of Chicago on October 15th, 2024, president-elect Trump suggested that if he were elected, the South Korean government would be “happy” to pay the U.S. $10 billion to maintain its military presence on the peninsula. In 2019, the U.S. spent roughly $3.4 billion to maintain a force in Korea; troop levels have not significantly changed since then. This leaves open the possibility that the administration would maintain troop levels in Korea should the South Korean government bear the costs of stationing them. Whatever ultimately happens, the next four years will certainly mark a new chapter in the long history of camptown prostitution in South Korea.