The Gulf in Africa: Examining Possible Motivations Behind UAE Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War
The Sudanese Civil War has gained global attention for the magnitude of its humanitarian crisis. 11.3 million Sudanese have left their homes, including 8 million who are internally displaced and 3 million who have fled to neighboring countries. 25.6 million Sudanese face severe hunger and famine has already reached refugee camps in the state of North Darfur, with another 13 areas at risk.
The civil war began in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum in April 2023. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are vying to gain control of Sudan. The two rival factions of the Sudanese military worked together in the 2019 coup to overthrow President Omar al-Bashir but have failed to cooperate since. The RSF was formed out of the Janjaweed militia, a group responsible for “mass displacement, sexual violence, kindapping, and other crimes” committed across the Darfur region during the Second Sudanese Civil War in the early 2000s.
Despite pervasive poverty throughout Sudan, the SAF and RSF have received cash and weaponry from foreign countries. The SAF and human rights groups have identified the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as an enabler of the RSF’s war crimes committed during the current conflict, accusing them of sending “heavy weapons, missiles, and ammunition”.
In September, 2024, the United Nations Security Council unanimously extended the arms embargo in Sudan’s West Darfur region, where the deadliest fighting has occurred. A previous United Nations report, however, found “credible” allegations that the UAE was violating the arms embargo. With the West preoccupied in Ukraine and Gaza, little meaningful action has been taken to force the SAF and RSF into dialogue, or compel the UAE to stop or even admit its involvement. In this environment, the UAE has exerted unopposed influence on the conflict. While much has been made of the UAE’s involvement, little has been reported on possible motivations.
See this map from Thomas van Linge depicting RSF and SAF areas of control as of January 2, 2025
Gulf Investment Fills Voids of Economic Underdevelopment
Since the early 2000s, Middle Eastern states have increasingly looked abroad to diversify their economic interests from oil. Africa has become a hub for Middle Eastern investment due to its proximity and potential for economic growth. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates has spearheaded this effort. The GCC was formed with the goal of “co-ordinating, integrating, and interconnecting” Gulf states across all fields to achieve unity and cooperation.
Over the last decade, the GCC has invested over $100 billion in Africa, including $59.4 billion from the UAE. During this period, the UAE was the fourth largest foreign direct investor in Africa, behind only China, the E.U., and the United States. The economic turmoil of Covid-19 and the disruption to agriculture markets from the war in Ukraine proved a catalyst for deeper economic integration between the Gulf and Africa. In 2023, the GCC invested $53 billion across 73 projects in African agriculture, mining, and shipping. The GCC hopes that the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area will enable it to invest with greater ease and access a potential market of 1.7 billion people by 2030.
Foreign investment has been encouraged by the Sudanese government in response to the country's faltering economy. After the secession of South Sudan in 2011, the state lost control of 75% of its oil fields, eliminating 95% of its exports and cutting Sudan’s government revenue in half. In 2013, the government passed the National Investment Encouragement Act to develop and expand new industries. The act attracts foreign investment with limited regulation, tax exemptions, and government support. The UAE has taken advantage of Sudanese business concessions to expand its economic footprint in the country.
Ensuring Food Security and Strengthening Stake in Illegal Gold Trade
Emirati investment has been particularly active in agriculture. Sudan — dubbed a future breadbasket for Africa and the Middle East — has 210 million acres of arable land for farming, primarily along the Nile River which runs through the middle of the country. Yet only about 25% of that land is currently productive. In the early 2000s, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir turned to GCC countries to help invest in Sudanese agriculture and expand the industry.
The UAE’s first foreign land agreement — buying large tracts of land abroad — was with Sudan 50 years ago. Since then, the UAE has signed 55 additional land agreements with 14 land acquisition deals still on the table, primarily in Africa. There is a lack of information on the specifics of Emirati land agreements because many are believed to be long-term leases, but several known cases have involved agricultural land.
With the majority of the globe's unused agricultural land, East Africa is critical to the UAE’s future. A lack of arable land means GCC states import up to 85% of their food supply. The strain of Covid and the war in Ukraine tested the GCC’s ability to maintain food security. Sudan’s proximity and its positioning on the Red Sea make it an obvious partner to prevent similar future instability.
In their 2018 national strategy for food security, the UAE announced its goal to be number one on The Economist’s Global Food Security Index by 2051 — further highlighting Emirati motivations to invest in Sudanese agriculture.
See this map from Bloomberg depicting the foreign farmers of Sudan
To secure the utility of their agricultural investments, the UAE invested in a new Red Sea port. In 2022, AD Ports Group, a trade and logistics company that is majority-owned by a UAE sovereign wealth fund, and Invictus Investments, a Sudanese conglomerate and self-described full-service commodity trading company, struck a $6 billion dollar deal with the Sudanese government. Emirati news outlets confirmed AD and Invictus will have the “right to develop, manage, and operate port and economic zone assets” in Sudan. The proposed building of the Abu Amama Port along the Red Sea would allow the UAE to easily transport African agricultural products to the Gulf.
UAE investments in Sudan extend beyond agriculture. In addition to attracting foreign investment after the secession of South Sudan, the Sudanese government doubled down on gold mining. Gold accounted for half of Sudanese exports in 2022, totaling $2.32 billion — $2.29 billion of which went to the UAE that year. In May 2023, the U.S. State Department noted that “nearly all” Sudanese gold goes to the UAE.
Prior to the civil war, the Sudanese government controlled all rights to search and extract mineral resources. However, the chaos of war has greatly reduced government control. The RSF relies heavily on artisanal gold mining — labor intensive and low-tech mining — as a source of revenue. The RSF smuggles gold out of Sudan to the UAE, which is a key gold refiner in the region. Up to 85% of Sudanese gold is believed to be smuggled out of the country, making the $2.32 billion exported in 2022 likely a drastic underestimate. Global demand for gold has increased in recent years as central banks in China and India, among others, have expanded their gold reserves to decrease reliance on the US dollar.
The UAE Faces Consequences
While the UAE and RSF are both Arab, Emirati support is not dependent on ethnic similarities. The UAE arms the Rapid Support Forces because they believe the RSF can protect their long-term interests. Because neither the RSF or SAF are well trained or armed, arms shipments of modern weapons provide a significant advantage. Arming the RSF is a relatively low-cost tactic that has the potential to expand Emirati influence in Sudan.
The UAE is banking on a victorious but weakened RSF to become indebted to the UAE, providing them greater access to agricultural land and maintaining their role in the gold mining industry. If the UAE can create a reliant RSF, they could exert advantageous influence on the new government in the case of their victory. A map of land use and land cover in Sudan linked below reveals that the RSF currently controls much of the land suitable for agriculture in the Darfur and areas around Khartoum that the UAE hopes to take advantage of.
See this map of land-cover and land-use in Sudan
However, the UAE and the RSF face several emerging challenges. On November 5, 2024, the SAF announced the cancellation of the Abu Amama port project. Citing UAE support for the RSF, Sudan’s Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim stated “after what happened with the UAE, we will not give them a single centimeter of Sudanese land”. The SAF are also expected to cancel the building of a road between the port and a neighboring UAE agricultural operation.
In early December, the SAF launched an offensive attack on the RSF-controlled Al Jazirah state, a breadbasket region outside Khartoum. The SAF recently captured the state capital Wad Madani, after 13 months under RSF control. According to the Sudan War Monitor, Wad Madani was “a gateway for the RSF to extend control over vast swathes of farmland and villages in central Sudan”.
Turkey has offered to mediate peace talks between the RSF and SAF. Their plans drew attention for including the UAE as a party in negotiations, not an observer as they were in talks organized by the United States. Turkey has emerged as a powerbroker in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia. Turkish geo-political influence could threaten Emirati plans and revive a regional-rivalry.
Further complicating matters for the UAE, in early January, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned eight companies based in the UAE that are described as “RSF weapons suppliers and and related companies”. These sanctions represent the first attempts by the Biden administration to address the UAE’s role in the Sudanese Civil War.
These latest developments throw a wrench in the UAE’s plans for both food security and influence in Sudanese mining operations. Considering the $59.4 billion the UAE has already invested in Sudan over the last decade, it would be too costly for them to pack up and move out.
It remains to be seen how Emirati strategy will shift as the war develops or if new motivations become apparent that dominate future decision making. What is certain is that ordinary Sudanese citizens are caught up in a conflict that has morphed beyond an intra-state civil war. The lack of attention paid by the international community has not only permitted the Sudanese Civil War to spiral out of control but has also allowed the UAE to exert outsized influence on the conflict.
