Kurt’s Korner: Sportswashing in Saudi Arabia, Explained
Sportswashing is the word du jour for the modern sports world. It describes a centuries-old but increasingly prevalent practice: one’s (usually a country, but also a corporation or individual) use of sports, or sporting events, to “whitewash” their reputation. For some analysts, sportswashing involves an attempt to gain an influential seat at the table of international politics. For others, it is purely a public relations exercise — a show of soft power to cover up unwanted scandals.
The classical example of sportswashing is the 1936 Berlin Olympics, hosted by Hitler’s Nazi Germany. The 1936 Games were intended to showcase the Aryan spirit and prove German dominance over their peers. It is no coincidence that Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia, which captures the events of the 1936 Olympics, is one of the most famous — and influential — propaganda films of all time. However, sportswashing is not exclusive to fascists. Each time “The Star-Spangled Banner” is sung at a sporting event, the President throws the ceremonial first pitch, or the Blue Angels fly over the Super Bowl, sportswashing is happening. Such displays of nationalism are inherently displays of power, and make associations between the United States and sporting excellence inevitable.
Sportswashing is an overwhelmingly negative label, which is why it typically isn’t associated with symbols of American patriotism. Instead, it connotes human rights abuses and military coups intentionally papered over by soccer matches. The term became popular in light of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, held in Qatar. Some observers claimed the reported 6500 migrant worker deaths associated with the event’s construction and anti-LGBTQ+ crackdown were successfully sportswashed by the hosts, who presented the World Cup trophy to a joyous, bisht-wearing Lionel Messi. Others believed the World Cup only brought global attention to Qatar’s problems, forcing modern policy changes. This ambiguity has been debated but ultimately lies somewhere between the two extremes. The same cannot be said for Saudi Arabia, which has, seemingly, mastered the art of sportswashing.
Saudi Arabia’s unlikely rise as a sporting paradise has not been an accident. Buoyed by petrodollars and boundless ambition, the Saudis have become home to a Formula One Grand Prix, several boxing and MMA title bouts, the FIFA Club World Cup, and an annual WWE event. In the next ten years, they are slated to host ATP (Association of Tennis Professionals) and WTA (Women’s Tennis Association) events, the 2027 AFC Asian Cup, and the 2034 FIFA Men’s World Cup.
The latter event — the biggest international tournament in the world’s biggest sport —coincides with the rise of the Saudi Pro League, the country’s professional soccer league. In the summer of 2023, Saudi clubs spent over $450 million in transfer fees, only outdone by the English Premier League. Led by Al-Nassr and Al-Hillal, Saudi teams have attracted the likes of Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema, Sadio Mané, and N’Golo Kanté. Other stars, such as Lionel Messi and Kylian Mbappe, reportedly received contract offers worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Some players — notably England’s Jordan Henderson — were heavily criticized by LGBTQ+ organizations upon their arrival in Saudi Arabia and have since returned to Europe. However, the Gulf state’s financial allure is competitive with that of major European clubs, threatening to overturn world soccer’s established order.
Evidenced by the expenditures of the Saudi Pro League, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), is a constant contributor to the sports world. The PIF is directly controlled by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), the country’s de facto ruler. He is therefore the owner of Newcastle United Football Club, an English soccer club founded in 1892 and bought by the PIF in 2021. MBS’s injection of funds into the team, which returned Newcastle to relevance after decades of squalor, was met with exultation in Northeast England. While some fans have denied Saudi involvement, the club has released consecutive kits that perfectly match the Saudi Arabian national team — a shade of dark green that has never been worn by the illustrious, centuries-old club.
The PIF also controls LIV Golf, an upstart competitor to golf’s traditional powerhouse, the PGA Tour. LIV Golf boasts shorter events, shorter time commitments, guaranteed payouts, and a low-pressure team format. It also drastically raised the amount of money in the sport, consistently offering wages higher than even the most lucrative PGA Tour events; 2022 LIV Golf events paid out $25 million to the field and $4 million to the winner, while the 2022 Master’s Tournament, the most prestigious competition in golf, paid $15 million total and $2.7 million to the winner. The financial allure of LIV — compounded by multimillion-dollar signing bonuses — has attracted some of the biggest names in golf. The sport’s biggest star, Tiger Woods, allegedly declined an offer in the realm of $800 million to join LIV. However, major championship winners Jon Rahm, Brooks Koepka, and Phil Mickelson have all joined LIV since its creation.
In total, The Guardian reported that Saudi Arabia had spent at least $6 billion in sports-related investments since 2021. This includes two billion to Saudi Pro League clubs, two billion to LIV Golf, and one billion to video game and e-sports company Embracer Group. Saudi or Saudi-related (such as Aramco, the country’s state-owned oil company) sports sponsorships also reach into the tens of millions of dollars and are often unreported. The Gulf state’s tourism board also employs celebrities to endorse the country as a travel paradise; Lionel Messi is reportedly paid millions of dollars for Instagram posts, advertising campaigns, and lavish family vacations promoting #VisitSaudi.
Saudi Arabia’s public relations shift — epitomized by its much-heralded Vision 2030 — signals a country ready to adopt liberal values. Within the decade, the country hopes to end its dependence on oil, diversify its economic portfolio (i.e. the PIF), and become the Islamic world’s beacon of innovation. Yet its politics tell a different, much darker story.
Saudi Arabia’s rise as a sports destination contradicts the lived reality of the Gulf state. According to Freedom House, Saudi Arabia scored an abysmal 8/100 (1/40 on political rights and 7/60 on civil liberties) in its 2024 Freedom in the World report. Its monarchy “is explicitly opposed to democracy,” prohibits any form of political opposition, and suppresses the rights of women, religious minorities, and the LGBTQ+ community. Government intrusions into individual rights, such as travel, marriage, and property, are upheld by a discriminatory, monarch-controlled legal system. Saudis who fall outside the bounds of the privileged class (male heterosexual Sunni citizens with ties to the crown) are restricted; those who fight back are oppressed, tortured, or executed. While Jamal Khashoggi’s state-approved assassination in a Saudi consulate is the best-known example of the regime’s brutality, harrowing stories of mass executions and killings of migrants underscore the despotism masked by Saudi sports investments. Ultimately, the arrival of the world’s best athletes has not contributed to any meaningful domestic reform — changing the conversation around Saudi Arabia, but not the reality of human rights violations.
Saudi officials deny allegations of sportswashing. Yasir al-Rumayyan, the governor of the PIF, claimed investment in sports is to “improve quality of living” for the “75 percent of [the Saudi] population under 35.” Mohammad bin Salman took a different view, arguing that his goal was to grow the Saudi Arabian economy. Putting aside the human rights violations and financial woes that refute these two assertions, it does not matter if Saudi Arabia explicitly recognizes its sportswashing movement. Sportswashing is unequivocally happening, regardless of intention.
This article is the first of a multi-part series analyzing Saudi Arabia’s sportswashing effort. Part II will answer “Is Saudi sportswashing working?” while part III will speculate on the future of Saudi sportswashing.