La Paz Absoluta: The Future of the ELN in Colombia
In early January 2025, violence erupted in Colombia’s northern Catatumbo state, near the border with Venezuela. 50,000 people fled to the neighboring municipality of Cúcuta and into Venezuela after the National Liberation Army (El Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), a Marxist guerrilla group, clashed with former members of the disbanded FARC. At least 80 people were killed. Noticias Uno, an investigative news program, cites a government document claiming the two groups are in conflict over a “multi-million-dollar cocaine shipment that was lost in November 2024.” The Colombian government has deployed 5,000 soldiers and declared a state of emergency after ELN fighters went house-to-house killing former FARC fighters.
The Catatumbo region, an ELN stronghold, has become an epicenter for cocaine production and trafficking. The ELN is one of the oldest guerilla groups in Latin America and was formed after the Colombian civil war in the 1960s — known as La Violencia — by Catholic radicals, university students, and leftist intellectuals inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The group has battled the Colombian state for more than 60 years, resulting in the displacement of 8 million people and deaths of 450,000. The ELN resists the Colombian state and multinational corporations who they claim have worsened inequality in the country.
In Colombia, 80% of the land is controlled by 1% of the population, underlining the historical inequality that plagues Colombian society. Yet, the ELN’s tactics have done little to elicit change. By mid-2024, the number of internally displaced people in Colombia swelled to 7 million, an increase of 1.4 million since a 2016 peace agreement that demilitarized the FARC, Colombia’s largest insurgency group. The increase is largely blamed on the ELN, which has filled the power vacuum left by the FARC and expanded its operational territory. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, the number of Colombians who live in conflict zones has increased from 3.5 million in 2021 to 8.4 million in 2024.
Venezuela
The ELN has relied on the Maduro regime in Venezuela for protection. ELN members are believed to operate out of Venezuela, particularly during periods of conflict with the Colombian government. In 2022, the U.S. State Department noted that Venezuela has cooperated with the ELN when “interests align” and that the ELN has “formed symbiotic relationships with [Venezuelan] military and security officials" to protect their operations, including drug and human trafficking. The ELN has operated in 40 Venezuelan municipalities across eight states and is now the most important armed group in Colombia and Venezuela.
The International Crisis Group is calling the ELN “an extension” of Venezuelan security forces. Reports from Human Rights Watch claim that the Venezuelan government worked with the ELN to eliminate rival guerrilla groups. The leading cause of the ELN’s “improbable resurgence” over the last 25 years, is support from the Venezuelan government. The International Crisis Group, without hard evidence, has reason to believe that Venezuelan forces allowed up to 80 armed combatants to travel through the border states of Táchira and Zulia before crossing the border into Colombia. These combatants are believed to have taken part in the violence in Catatumbo.
In late January, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments conducted a “coordinated offensive” along the border in response to the violence in Catatumbo. Colombia and Venezuela renormalized diplomatic relations in 2022 after a break in 2019. The January offensive is the first joint security operation since renormalization. On January 23, Maduro reiterated that Colombia “will always have our full support to build a region of peace and unity.”
Venezuela’s cooperation with Colombia is unlikely to cause a shift in relations with the ELN. Maduro, who recently claimed victory in an election widely criticized as fraudulent, may be looking to forge better relations with neighboring states, like Colombia.
Total Peace
Colombian President Gustavo Petro has embarked on a total peace campaign since he entered office in 2022. Petro is Colombia’s first leftist president and a former guerilla himself. Petro promised to end guerilla violence in Colombia after over 60 years of armed confrontation. The 2016 deal that demobilized the FARC was seen as a possible blueprint for the ELN. However, the weakness of the newly formed FARC political party, attacks against former FARC members from right wing paramilitary groups, and the failure of economic reintegration, among other issues, have plagued the agreement. Some former FARC fighters have remobilized, including those who clashed with the ELN in January 2024.
Peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN have repeatedly stalled or ended after renewed violence by the ELN. Negotiations in Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico throughout 2022 resulted in a temporary national ceasefire in August 2023. The six-month ceasefire was renewed in February 2024. In August 2024, the renewal expired and the ELN resumed kidnappings, pipe bombs, and military attacks — including an attack on an army base in September that killed two soldiers. In response, President Petro unilaterally pulled out of peace talks with the ELN. In November, Petro and the ELN restarted peace talks only to end negotiations again on January 17.
Structural issues within the ELN are likely to blame for inconsistent strategy. The ELN has historically been plagued by internal divisions and diverging goals. Talks broke down in 2022 after the Colombian government split negotiations between the ELN and a splinter unit from the southwest. Structural issues have led the ELN to prioritize unity and cohesion over peace at all costs, resulting in a revolving door of peace talks with no long-term agreements to disarm or disband. Repeated government engagement has failed to overcome structural hurdles within the group. ELN leadership have not voiced discontent over attacks that ended negotiations, signaling both their desire to display unity and possible struggle to control factions within the group.
President Petro entered office as the first leftist President in Colombian history with a promise to end the violence. With less than a year and a half left in office, he has nothing to show for his efforts.
Transformation
It appears that Colombia’s armed groups, especially new splinter groups, have transformed from ideologically driven anti-state actors to drug trafficking, criminal organizations. A significant problem faced by domestic insurgency groups is goal displacement. While a group may have a goal of social or political reform, their desire to maintain relevance and to survive ultimately supersedes their ideological goals. After fighting the state for 60 years to no avail and seeing the irrelevance of FARC’s new political party, the ELN is seeking even greater influence in the Latin American drug trade to maintain relevance and to survive.
The Future
The profits of drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion have allowed the ELN to continue to operate within Colombia and resist law enforcement. Convincing the ELN to return to the negotiating table will require the Colombian government to both reduce ELN income streams and convince Venezuela to enforce stronger border security.
The Colombian government has shifted its negotiating framework from national level dialogues on political and economic reform to community-based dialogues that directly address local problems. The government is also no longer demanding demobilization but instead only for groups to reduce violence on civilians. This shift is meant to address the changing strategy of the ELN and other armed groups who no longer directly confront the government, but fight among themselves for control of rural communities. Through increasing military pressure and tailoring reforms for specific communities, the government hopes to regain leverage over the ELN.
Such efforts are threatened by the Trump Administration’s dismantling of USAID. Colombia receives $440 million annually from USAID that helps fund 80 programs throughout the country. Programs that address rural economic development, land reform, and climate are critical for the Colombian government in its effort to combat the ELN. By addressing rural inequality, the Colombian government can undermine the drug trade that fuels ELN perpetrated violence.
The U.S. has also contributed 42% of the foreign aid used to implement the Colombian government’s 2016 deal with the FARC, totaling $1.26 billion. The aid was used to fund land reform and a transitional justice system for FARC fighters. If former FARC fighters are unable to effectively reintegrate into Colombian society, they may join or create new armed groups that will fuel greater violence in Colombia.
Armed groups have operated in the Colombian countryside since the 1920s, gaining influence and power during and since La Violencia. These groups have come to define politics in Colombia and the many rural communities they control. While the future of the ELN is still unclear, Colombia must find a way to reconcile inequality and a perpetual history of violence to secure a lasting peace and redefine the modern Colombian state.